Wikileaks: Armenia faced Georgia’s “hostility” during its 2008 war with Russia
Published: Tuesday November 30, 2010
American diplomat Joe Pennington described Armenia's predicament during 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Official photo
Washington - Senior Armenian officials complained to the U.S. Embassy of "hostile attitude" from the Georgian government even as Armenia maintained neutrality and offered help amid Georgian-Russian fighting for South Ossetia in August 2008.
According to diplomatic cables made available by Wikileaks and first released online by Russkiy Reporter magazine, as fighting began Georgia diverted some fifty percent of natural gas that Russia supplies to Armenia and detained Armenia-bound cargoes threatening to commandeer them "for its national needs."
Georgia remains the main conduit for Armenia's commerce with the world, with over 70 percent of Armenia's goods - particularly energy and commodities - transported overland through Georgia. The conflict between Georgia and Russia is one between Armenia's main trade conduit and Armenia's main military ally.
Cables prepared by U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Armenia Joe Pennington reported on his meetings and conversations with businessman Mikhail Baghdasarov on August 9, Deputy Foreign Minister Gegham Garibjanian on August 11, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian and Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian on August 14, and another meeting with Nalbandian on August 15. Pennington served in Armenia as deputy chief of mission from 2007 until earlier this year.
According to Pennington's sources, several days before Georgian government launched its attack on South Ossetia two Georgian entities that control shipment of Armenian goods from ports of Poti and Batumi, respectively, announced more than a three-fold price hike on shipping Armenia-bound goods, resulting in interruptions in regular supplies.
Armenian officials saw the move as stemming from a "political decision" and complained that Georgian counterparts stopped taking their phone calls shortly before the fighting began on August 8.
According to Nalbandian, after the fighting began President Serge Sargsyan placed telephone calls to Russian and Georgian presidents on the same day, but whereas Dmitry Medvedev was available to talk, Mikhail Saakashvili was not.
By August 11, Armenian officials were in a state of "near-panic" as Georgian supply interruptions threatened Armenia with fuel and food shortages. According to their reports, Armenia-bound goods were selectively targeted for detention while goods shipped to Azerbaijan continued unimpeded.
In his August 15 meeting with Pennington, Nalbandian said that Armenia avoided public criticism of Georgia's "hostile attitude" and sought an amicable way forward. Armenia, Nalbandian warned, wanted to preclude a negative reaction by Javakheti Armenians that would be "very dangerous" for Georgia.
Pennington understood the words as an "obvious threat" of retaliation that Armenia might resort to should Georgia continue to block deliveries. Georgia in turn saw its pressure on Armenia as a way to indirectly pressure Russia.
Meantime, as Russian military moves spread panic through Georgia and its air space was shut down, Armenia opened its border to thousands of evacuees from Georgia and accepted a European Union proposal for Yerevan to serve as a transit point for humanitarian deliveries to Georgia.
According to a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, with the Georgian airspace closed, flights to and from Yerevan, including those to and from Russia, were routed over Turkey.
For their part, Georgian officials claimed that Russian navy was allowing vessels with Armenian goods through to Georgian ports, while detaining and diverting others, an August 16 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi reported.
Georgians also suspected that Russia initially kept the Georgian railroad unharmed to keep supplies to Armenia going.
But later on August 16, an explosion on Georgian rail line blamed on Russian forces fully suspended rail traffic to Tbilisi, as well as to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is unclear, if that move was at all precipitated on knowledge that Georgia was already blocking supplies to Armenia.
In his comments, Pennington sounded unconvinced that fuel or food shortages were as imminent as Armenian officials claimed and sought "to sooth Armenian pique."
The U.S. Chargé also suggested that Armenians should encourage Russia to cease military activities in Georgia as first priority before worrying about their own economic situation.
Pennington acknowledged, however, that Georgian "snubbing" was "particularly upsetting to Armenians because they believe they have bent over backward to be even-handed, to reach out in good faith to Georgian leaders, to insist that Russia not use Armenian-based forces in Georgia, to welcome Georgian refugees with open arms (waiving passport and document requirements, dispatching the Migration Agency chief to the border to smooth every difficulty), and to facilitate any kind of humanitarian aid shipment to Georgia via Yerevan."
Armenia's recurrent difficulties with Georgia, on issues such as natural gas and cargo transportation as well as treatment of Georgia's Armenian community, have long been known. Newly-released diplomatic cables offer a glimpse into Armenia's efforts to maintain the often tenuous relationship.

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