Karabakh MP: An unpleasant division of labor

Gegham Baghdasarian discusses Madrid principles and Karabakh politics

by Emil Sanamyan

Published: Friday November 27, 2009

Gegham Bagdasarian.
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Cover of the October 2009 issue of Analyticon. The issue focuses on soccer diplomacy between Armenia and Turkey.

Since 2005 Gegham Baghdasarian has been a member of Karabakh parliament. He was elected on the ARF-Movement1988 ticket but is now an independent member of parliament. In the 2007 presidential elections he was in charge of Masis Mayilian's campaign.

In the 1990s, Mr. Baghdasarian was press secretary for NKR's parliament, served in the Karabakh Army, and twice headed the official Azat Artsakh newspaper. Since 1999 he has been editor of Tassord Nahang and Demo newspapers; he now edits the magazine Analyticon. Baghdasarian is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and Security Issues, a Stepanakert-based nongovernmental group now led by Mr. Mayilian.

He spoke with our Washington Editor Emil Sanamyan on November 4 in Stepanakert.

Political past

Emil Sanamyan: How did the idea for ­Analyticon come about?

Gegham Baghdasarian: It came about when I realized that the newspaper Demo, which I published for a number of years, had in a way completed its mission. Since 2007, when nearly all political parties backed Bako Sahakian for president, there has been no formal political opposition in Karabakh. And Demo began to be seen as sort of a substitute for that opposition.

In reality Demo was always intended as an independent public newspaper and not an opposition publication or especially an opposition entity. We did not want to have a newspaper that would artificially fill the political vacuum.

ES: But you did play a political role, as opposition member of parliament and in the latest presidential elections.

GB: True, but I always differentiated my political involvement and journalism. Even as editor of the official Azat Artsakh newspaper, I sought to keep the publication as an open platform and separate my responsibilities as a state official and a journalist.

In fact in 1999 I was forced to resign from Azat Artsakh over an article I reprinted that was critical of the newly appointed prime minister [Anushavan Danielian]. At the time the parliament refused to accept my resignation and the issue was only resolved only after Robert Kocharian, then already president of Armenia, got involved.

In 2004 I formally became involved in politics with the establishment of the opposition Movement­1988 party, which that same year supported its candidate Eduard Aghabekian for mayor of Stepanakert.

We won that election, defeating a pro-government candidate in two rounds. That came as a great surprise for the government and to an extent even for us.

The reason for our success, I think, was the existence of a protest electorate that backed us, and also relative lack of interest in that election by President Arkady Ghoukasian.

But already in the following year, in 2005, came parliamentary elections for which the government prepared much better. In particular, in addition to the pro­government Democratic Artsakh party, a second party - Free Motherland - was established that was also quite critical of the government.

They were able to defeat us, leaving the opposition bloc of Movement­1988 and Dashnaktsutiun with just three of 33 seats in parliament.

The government also did what they could to restrict the influence of Aghabekian as mayor and in 2007 he did not run for re-election. By then the Aghabekian-led faction of Movement1988 together with Dashnaktsutiun and the two pro-government parties endorsed Bako Sahakian for president.

ES: What was the reason for this unanimity in terms of support for Mr. Sahakian?

GB: Dashnaktsutiun's support was most important, and I think it came as a result of the intervention of the party leadership in Yerevan, where the ARF was part of the ruling coalition at the time. So the ARF left the opposition bloc in Karabakh. And many in Movement­1988 felt they could not win the election on their own.

Nevertheless, many rank-and-file members of Dashnaktsutiun and other parties supported ­Masis Mayilian's campaign.

ES: And what was the reason for Sahakian's candidacy in the first place? He was not a public figure for most of the Ghoukasian presidency and his nomination came as a surprise.

GB: True. And I think once again, preferences of Armenia's leadership played a key role. I think Sahakian was seen as lacking in ambition; he enjoyed good relations with everyone; and I guess Ghoukasian was looking to retain a behind-the-scenes role in the new administration.

But that did not work for Ghoukasian, just as it hadn't worked in other countries where outgoing presidents have sought to control their successors.

Assessing the present and future

ES: How do you assess the two years of Sahakian's presidency? How does it differ from Ghoukasian's presicency?

GB: On the whole I see [Sahakian's presidency] negatively. There are improvements. The current government, I think, is less corrupt and more attentive to public demands. But these are nuances.

But I think the biggest problem is that of the three presidents we have had, Sahakian is the least independent from Yerevan. Both Kocharian and Ghoukasian were naturally ambitious individuals and staked out more independent positions [from Yerevan].

ES: But judging by NKR's reaction to the publication of the Madrid principles in July, its position was different from Armenia's.

GB: I don't agree with that. Initially, NKR's reaction was quite muted. The rhetoric toughened up only after the Karabakh public voiced its opposition and especially when Armenia's president [Serge Sargsyan] began to make tougher statements himself.

Most recently, the statements criticizing the Madrid principles made by Prime Minister Ara Harutiunian came following President Sargsyan's comments during recent military exercises in Karabakh.

By accepting the Madrid Principles as a basis for negotiations, the Yerevan leadership has showed that it is willing in principle to agree to one-sided territorial concessions that could have horrific consequences for Armenian interests.