InternationalHow not to open minds and borders
Express solutions that sidestep the major issues are counterproductive
Published: Friday September 04, 2009
Cambridge, Mass. - A version of this commentary appeared in Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies 18:1, 2009.
On April 14, 2009, the International Crisis Group, a think tank that provides suggestions on resolving conflicts around the globe, issued a report titled Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, in which it made recommendations for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and the establishment of bilateral relations between the republics of Armenia and Turkey.
The report was published after President Barack Obama's visit to Turkey (April 6-7) and eight days before the foreign ministries of Armenia and Turkey and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs issued a joint statement about a roadmap for normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey.
The ICG report attempts to situate its recommendations at a time when Turkey and Armenia "are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled the Caucasus." Despite past difficulties, the report claims, "progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change" have transformed the relationship between these two countries and brought them close to a historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties, and begin joint work on "reconciliation."
Through a glass rosily
The report, with an idealistic - not to say superficial - tone, paints a very optimistic picture of current Armenian-Turkish relations. It tends to view minor developments in the sphere of the Armenian-Turkish relations through a magnifying glass, and makes vast generalizations, bypassing crucial issues that remain major obstacles to a sincere Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.
The report aims to provide a solution to the century-old Armenian-Turkish conflict in 34 pages. It claims that the views of history among Turks and Armenians are "significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be healed." But it leaves the reader wondering what major indications point to such a significant convergence of views.
In the beginning of the report, the ICG provides an executive summary and recommendations for Turkish-Armenian relations. The tone, from the very start, is that of a school principal speaking to two students caught fighting in the courtyard; after rebuking them, he or she demands that they set aside their animosity and shake hands.
In its recommendations section, the report advises Turkey and Armenia alike to "agree, ratify, and implement a normalization package including the opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral commissions, continue to prepare public opening for reconciliation." It recommends that Armenia avoid using the legislative assemblies of third countries to pass resolution pertaining to the Armenian Genocide - though such resolutions aren't initiated by Armenia - while advising Turkey not to hold Armenia accountable for these actions.
Acquiescing in falsification
As to Nagorno-Karabakh, the report advises Turkey not to insist on Armenian concessions there as a precondition for the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations. Furthermore, it recommends both countries to pursue broader research on matters pertaining to the "events of 1915."
The report insists that both parties have to compromise what it calls their historical views, for the sake of normalization. This recommendation raises a major ethical question about the extent to which a victimized group should be expected to acquiesce in a falsification of history in order to satisfy a perpetrator group.
It advises third parties (the United States, Russia, and the European Union) to avoid legislation that might inflame the public opinion on either side - meaning the Turkish side - and to back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation projects.
The report is divided into seven sections. In its introduction, it discusses briefly the "history" of the Armenian-Turkish relations, taking the visit of Turkish president Abdullah Gül, on the invitation of his Armenian counterpart, as a stepping stone toward a process of normalization.
Avoiding history
The second section, about the state of negotiations, claims that a "package deal" is on the table. This deal is comprised of the establishment of full diplomatic ties, opening of border crossings, and a new intergovernmental commission, including a sub-commission to address the "historical dimension."
The third section, titled "The Burdens of Conflicting Histories," deals with the ways in which Armenia and Turkey view the "events of 1915." The report acknowledged in footnote 65 that the ICG is not a specialist in Ottoman or genocide studies, but strives to "collect the arguments of different people about the many narratives and debates, put them in contemporary political context and show where they influence Turkey-Armenia relations." How can any attempt toward the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations take place without a proper assessment of history? This is an area in which the ICG report fails. The major deficiency of the report is that it lacks serious historical analysis and documentation of Armenian-Turkish relations, and fails to discuss the real issues that hamper a genuine rapprochement between the two nations and countries.
The report draws a superficial picture of the nature of the Armenian-Turkish relations, without a sound understanding of power asymmetry, the dynamics of power, historical transformations, regional and international politics, and most importantly, the complexity of the Armenian diaspora.
The report presents the 1915 "events" from two perspectives, which it labels as Turkish and Armenian. It attempts to demonstrate that a convergence has been taking place by noting that some Turkish intellectuals describe the Armenian Genocide as "Büyük Felaket," supposedly the translation of the Armenian "Medz Yeghern," which is "frequently used by the Armenians to describe the events of 1915." The sources and the evidence in this section on the Armenian Genocide are extremely weak. For example, only one independent Armenian historian is interviewed to present the "Armenian side" of the question. Another problem is that it portrays the Armenian government as the sole player in Armenian-Turkish relations, and by doing so it denies agency to the Armenian diaspora.
