Armenian Reporter:

The Basic Principles are not in the interests of Karabakh and Armenia

Published: Friday July 24, 2009

Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh - The text of the joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev, U.S. President Barack Obama, and President of France Nicolas Sarkozy hardly differs from other statements made earlier at various levels and within the framework of various international structures in support of the OSCE Minsk process. It is noteworthy that now the presidents of the three countries urge the Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities to finalize their agreement on concrete principles of settlement that were published on the official website of the OSCE. (See page 3.)

We will comment briefly on each principle:

1. Return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control

Ceding any territory under NKR's control to Azerbaijan will mean first of all violation of the NKR's basic law, the Constitution, where these territories are fixed. Secondly, withdrawal of the subdivisions of the NKR's army from even part of the liberated territories will undermine the military and food security of the NKR.

The published principles have even no hint at the return to the NKR's control of more than 1,000 sq m of Karabakh lands occupied by Azerbaijan.

Not territories, but borders between the NKR and Azerbaijan should be spoken about at the negotiations. Only after the recognition of the NKR's statehood by Azerbaijan should a bilateral intergovernmental commission work on the delimitation and demarcation of state borders. That is the international practice of solving frontier arguments.

2. An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance

In reality, this principle means an attempt to limit the NKR's sovereignty by casting doubt on its independent status and to deprive the republic of its own security system. It is the recognition of the NKR's independence that would really ensure the security of the NKR and would give Artsakh new possibilities for maintaining its own security, including with political-diplomatic means.

3. A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh

Land communication between the NKR and Armenia was established in May 1992 and was enlarged during the operations of 1993. It would be naïve to limit the current full-scale land communication of the NKR with Armenia to a vulnerable "corridor." It is noteworthy that this principle is presented as a concession to Armenians.

4. Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will

The legal status of the NKR has already been determined on the basis of legally binding expression of will on December 10, 1991, and was confirmed by another referendum on adoption of the NKR Constitution on December 10, 2006. Besides, eight times the people of the NKR have indirectly expressed their adherence to independent statehood in republican presidential and parliamentary elections by voting for programs of political parties and individual candidates, in which the necessity of international recognition and strengthening of the NKR's statehood was mentioned. Thus, over the past 18 years, the citizens of the NKR expressed their support ten times for the independent status of the NKR.

5. The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence

This principle can be discussed by all three sides after the recognition of the NKR's independence by Azerbaijan. A positive moment is the use of the word "all" and not only Azerbaijani refugees. Yet, it is not understandable who can ensure the rights and guarantee the security, and how, of hundreds of thousands of people who may find themselves in the territory of the opposite side.

6. International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation

In essence, the proposal is to replace our own current system of military security with an inefficient mechanism of "blue helmets." The possible appearance of foreign armed forces in the territory of the NKR, even under the flag of authoritative international organizations, will immediately result in an abrupt limitation of the republic's sovereignty. The circumstance that the NKR's sovereignty has not yet been recognized by the international community, and the country is not represented at the above-mentioned structures, can result in Karabakh's having no levers of influence on these forces guaranteed by international law. Under these circumstances, the possible introduction of peacekeeping forces will radically contradict our national interests. The NKR cannot limit its state sovereignty without receiving its all-embracing international juridical recognition.

The passage of a state's direct obligations on maintaining security, together with concrete territories, to a third side do not guarantee the strengthening of this very security, and poses new threats.

Karabakh residents have their own experience of communicating with the "peacekeepers" of the Soviet period, when troops sent in the late 1980s for keeping the population's security chronically did not cope with their duties and failed to protect the Armenian population of the Azerbaijani SSR from massacres and violence. In 1991, by the order of the USSR leadership, these very troops banished the Armenian population from some parts of Artsakh (the Koltso operation). The peacekeeping operations demonstrated low efficiency in other conflict zones as well.

For the governments sending peacekeepers to a conflict region, their interests and the immediate security of these very peacekeepers will be always more important than the security of the local population.

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