Home / Opinion / Commentary

Is a resolution of the Karabakh conflict in the works?

If so, is it one that Armenians can live with? Not necessarily.

by Tatul Hakobyan

Published: Friday May 15, 2009

Yerevan - On May 11, Armenia's Foreign Ministry released a statement denying that the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, meeting in Prague on May 7, had discussed "the question of withdrawal" from territories under the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army. "The discussions were primarily about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and that is natural, for that is the central issue in the resolution of the Artsakh question," the statement read.

The question of withdrawal from territories may not have been discussed specifically in Prague on May 7. But it is important to remember that withdrawal from those territories is an essential element of the proposal now under discussion. The same was true of earlier proposals negotiated over the past 15 years.

Negotiating the status of Karabakh

It's an unwritten rule of diplomacy: what you categorically reject today you may beg for in vain tomorrow.

Examples exist in Armenian history. In February 1918, Armenians were encouraged to agree to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, marking Russia's exit from the First World War and handing the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi to Turkey. Armenians would not hear of it. Turkish troops continued their invasion of Armenia. By the end of the year, Armenians were begging for the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty to be respected, but Turkey refused to do so.

Azerbaijan has seen the same thing happen too. In the summer of 1991, when the Soviet Empire was breathing its last breaths, and its armed forces were trying one last time to crush Artsakh's aspirations for freedom, an Armenian delegation from Nagorno-Karabakh, headed by Leonard Petrossian, went to Baku to meet President Ayaz Mutalibov. It went with the blessing of Armenia's parliament and president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, and was ready to agree to such humiliating terms that are hard to envisage today, even in a nightmare. The terms were rejected by Azerbaijan.

Neither in 1988, when the new era of the Artsakh Movement began, nor in 1990-91, when Soviet internal forces and Azerbaijani militias, with the open support of the Kremlin,  jointly carried out Operation "Ring," could Armenians imagine that in 1994 they would win a glorious victory in the war imposed by the Azerbaijanis and would force the adversary to sign, on May 12, an indefinite cease-fire agreement, which has been maintained for 15 years and constitutes the greatest achievement of the Armenian side.

In the fall of 1997, Mr. Ter-Petrossian was ready to accede to an agreement that returned the territories adjacent to the old Nagorno-Karabakh region, with the exception of Lachin (and perhaps Kelbajar). The status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be left for the future. [For a systematic survey of past proposals, click here.] This option entered the contemporary history of Armenia under the labels "defeatist" and "treasonous." Without a doubt, the "step-by-step" solution that enjoyed Mr. Ter-Petrossian's support was a poor one. The question was and remains whether the ultimate solution will be any better.

The Madrid Principles

Today, two of the three sides to the conflict, Yerevan and Baku, are discussing a draft framework agreement known as the Madrid Principles. This agreement differs from Mr. Ter-Petrossian's "step-by-step" solution in two essential respects. One is that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be determined by a (new) referendum to be held in the indefinite future.

In other words, Baku would agree that Nagorno-Karabakh has the right to achieve self-determination through a referendum. Such an agreement, if signed, could be considered an achievement for the Armenian side. Most people, however, see it as little more than a face-saving measure.

A senior Armenian former official who has been deeply involved in the negotiations told this correspondent that the idea of a referendum was indeed put forth as a face-saving measure, but did not agree that the Madrid Principles were worse than the 1997 "step-by-step" proposal. The former official said Madrid is "the 1997 step-by-step plus." The "plus" is the delayed referendum, which will not actually take place, but is important in that Baku would agree in writing with the prospect of losing Nagorno-Karabakh.

The other difference between 1997 and Madrid is not a plus but a minus. In 1997 the proposal was for Karabakh to keep all of Lachin, not just a corridor 25 to 40 km wide. Moreover, the Armenian side did not agree at that time to return Kelbajar.

If in the spring of 1997, the OSCE Minsk Group "package" deal and the "step-by-step" deal presented later that year were rejected by the Karabakh (Armenian) side, thereafter it was the Azerbaijanis who were in the role of rejecting deals. In 1998, they turned down the "common state" solution; in 2001 they turned down the Key West proposals; and in 2006 they rejected the Rambouillet proposal.

Imposing a solution

Can proposals be rejected forever by one or the other party? Naturally no, since a rejection requires corresponding resources, which Yerevan does not have and Baku certainly does not have. (Stepanakert is ignored.)

More important, however, is how long the international community will tolerate rejection by one or the other side.

It seems that today the international community, and more specifically Moscow, Washington, and Brussels, are more determined than in the past. It seems also that the situation in the Caucasus region is more conducive to a resolution than it was before. If the time comes when all factors are conducive and the interests of international forces coincide, the resistance of the parties to the conflict could be ignored. Many international agreements have been signed in such circumstances, including the humiliating Dayton agreement signed by the Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milosevic.