InternationalIan Bremmer: no war over NK, same challenges for Genocide resolution
Prominent political risk consultant offers Armenia, regional outlook for 2009
Published: Thursday February 12, 2009
Ian Bremmer, 2d from right with, from left, Pres. Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian of Armenia, and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki of Iran at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Thursday Jan. 29. AP Photo: Michel Euler
Ian Bremmer is founder and President of Eurasia Group, one of the world's leading providers of political risk analysis for corporate clients. Self-described "intellectual entrepreneur" Mr. Bremmer, who turns 40 this year and is of Armenian and German descent, has built the consultancy from the ground up since 1998. The group is at 100 full-time staff in offices in New York, Washington and London, including former senior U.S. government planners and analysts, and hundreds more contributing experts worldwide. On February 9 Mr. Bremmer spoke with Armenian Reporter's Washington editor Emil Sanamyan about risks faced by Armenia and the world.
Nonpolar world and Russian regional dominance
AR: In a Foreign Affairs article last year, Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, observed that the world order was shifting from U.S.-dominated "uni-polar" one to a "non-polar" state of affairs. And you agree with that view. What does this mean for the world and for countries like Armenia?
IB: This [nonpolar arrangement] is unlikely to be the equilibrium outcome, [i.e., the world order will continue to undergo changes]. But there is no question that America's ability and willingness to do the heavy lifting on global issues is much more limited than it was five years ago or even one year ago.
What it means for a country like Armenia is that you are dealing much more with your immediate neighborhood. At the end of the day that means countries like Russia.
Look at what happened in Georgia. The Russian government, after a number of provocations, basically goaded the [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili to do something stupid and he did. And the Russians would have probably gone to Tbilisi if it was not for the U.S. and France.
The end of that story is they have got control [over the region]. You saw that the U.S. base in Kyrgyz Republic was forced out after the Russians threw a little more cash and engaged in political pressure [against the Kyrgyz government].
It is very clear that Russia believes that there is a region of the world that is in its sphere of influence, where [Russian interests] are privileged. In the same way the United States exists in Latin America. And the Russians intend to behave that way.
So if you are Armenia, a tiny landlocked country with very limited resources, it means that your relationship with Russia is going to become even more important than it has been.
AR: How significant an event was the war in Georgia last year? In terms of regional impact, was it on the scale of the September 11, 2001, attacks or perhaps even the Soviet breakup?
IB: No, because [Georgia] is a tiny little country and because, at the end of the day, you can give Russia 75 percent of the blame, but you have to give Saakashvili 25 percent [of the blame] for sheer lack of understanding of what he was getting himself into. Or lack of care.
Georgia is a small country, where the United States and Europeans are not prepared to move quickly on NATO integration or send troops to stop the Russians. It could have 9/11-type implications if Americans and Europeans decided that Georgia was an ally they could not allow to fall, but that was not the case.
When I wrote my early 2008 paper about expectant risks going forward [in 2008], I talked about Georgia. I didn't say it was going to be the number one risk, because it is not that big of a deal, but certainly the likelihood that Russians could have gone in, we could predict a while back.
AR: Do you see this sort of Russian resurgence exhibited again in 2009?
IB: We just saw that in the Kyrgyz Republic, and we saw that in a natural gas cut off to Ukraine earlier in the year that had implications for European countries.
And if people said that Russia attacked Georgia when a barrel of oil was $120 and Russians felt a lot stronger, the fact is that Russia cut off gas to Ukraine when oil was at $40 a barrel. So clearly, it is not just economic interest that is playing a role here for the Russian government.
The willingness of the Russian government to ensure that they have dominant political influence over Ukraine is significant. That may well mean that they play a more proactive role in trying to get [former prime minister Viktor] Yanukovich as the next president of Ukraine.
There is greater possibility for tensions over Crimea - both directly with local population that has a pro-Russian orientation and also in terms of the Russian naval base in [Crimea's port of] Sevastopol - and Russia continuing to leverage their energy influence over Ukraine.
I do not expect to see Russian tanks rolling into Kiev or anywhere else in the region. While there is always a possibility, if we are looking at the immediate future in 2009, there is not the same level of expectation of military confrontation that Russians could provoke that we saw with Georgia.
Aliyev's success and Karabakh stability
AR: Considering the increase in Russian influence and the fall of oil prices, which is very important to Azerbaijan, where do you see the Karabakh stand-off going?
IB: Clearly, the Armenians are showing more flexibility [in negotiations] than the Azeris are since [Armenians] recognize that they are increasingly in a weaker position than the Azeris, with all their resources and regional allies.
