Washington briefing: The Ossetia war

by Emil Sanamyan

Published: Saturday January 03, 2009

Russian tanks in Tskhinvali on August 8. AFP photo.

In 2008, Mr. Obama became Time magazine's Person of the Year, succeeding Vladimir Putin, who was that person in 2007. And although in 2008 he was succeeded as president by former aide Dmitry Medvedev, Mr. Putin became Russia's prime minister and remained its undisputed leader.

In August, as Georgia attempted to overrun its former province of South Ossetia - which has been outside Tbilisi's control since the 1991-92 war - it was Mr. Putin who first announced and then oversaw the implementation of a devastating Russian response.

The official reasons for Russian intervention were humanitarian: Georgia launched an indiscriminate bombing campaign against South Ossetian civilians, many of them Russian citizens, and targeted 500 Russian peacekeepers deployed there.

But Georgia's attack against Ossetia also provided a useful opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its commitment to defending its interests in the Caucasus, and broadly in Europe, and the unwillingness of the United States to challenge Russia militarily so close to its borders, indicating a shift in the perceived strategic balance.

Militarily, Russia proved its ability to route a U.S.-trained and equipped military with relative ease. And its air force, although much inferior to its American counterpart, was able to effectively target Georgia's military infrastructure, causing relatively little civilian damage.

And diplomatically, Russia unleashed an unprecedented public relations campaign - both domestically and internationally - to accompany its military actions much as the United States did before invading Iraq.

The war had two major effects for Armenian interests.

On the one hand, it noticeably tamed Azerbaijan's appetite for a military escalation over Karabakh - at least in the foreseeable future. This was reflected in a joint declaration signed by the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, that pledged a political solution to the conflict, and a change in the Azerbaijani posture along the Line of Contact with Armenian forces.

But a nearly complete disruption in Russian-Georgian relations has also hit Armenia's already restricted trade routes and made Georgia more dependent on Azerbaijan and Turkey.

In Georgia, ongoing political recriminations over the war may lead to a leadership change in the coming year that could both be accompanied by more instability and might also begin clear the air in Russian-Georgian relations.

But there is a silver lining to this situation as well. The de facto Georgian bulwark against Russia helps moderate the exercise of Moscow's influence over Armenia, leaving its leadership with more room for maneuver than it could otherwise have.

As in the past, Armenia continues to perform a difficult balancing act between its strategic Russian ally, its most important neighbor Georgia, as well as the European Union and the United States, which have promised continued economic support to Georgia and the region.