Vladimir Kazimirov: “In Karabakh, the overriding priority is to prevent a new war”

Veteran mediator criticizes OSCE for hands-off attitude

by Tatul Hakobyan

Published: Saturday January 26, 2008

Vladimir Kazimirov  . AIPRG

Editor's note: As Russia's envoy for Nagorno-Karabakh from 1992 to 1996, Ambassador Vladimir ­Kazimirov played a key role in securing the May 1994 cease-fire agreement. Born in 1929 in Moscow, Mr. Kazimirov served in the Soviet and later Russian Foreign Ministry since 1953, including at embassies in Europe, Africa and Latin America. His last posting was as Russia's ambassador to Costa Rica; he retired in 2000. Mr. Kazimirov is deputy chair of the Association of Russian Diplomats. He has remained concerned about the Karabakh conflict and comments on the subject frequently.

Reporter: Mr. Kazimirov, you have criticized international mediators working through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for their lax attitude toward Baku's militant rhetoric. In your keynote address at the conference organized by the Armenian International Policy and Research Group (AIPRG) in Yerevan on January 14 you made similar arguments. What can and should the OSCE and its Minsk Group mediators do?

Kazimirov: The priorities of Yerevan, Stepanakert, and Baku are well known. For Armenians this is about [achieving an internationally recognized] status for Nagorno-Karabakh; for Azerbaijan, it is liberation of the [Armenian-] controlled territories and return of internally displaced persons.

And what is the priority of the international community? It is to prevent a new war! There are a number of reasons for this, but I will focus on two of the most significant.

First unlike many of the "one-time" conflicts, the conflict in Karabakh has a tragic pre­history. Challenges here are more complex: not just to resolve the current conflict, but to put an end to the entire sequence of bloodletting between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Secondly, nowhere else is there such a desire for a new war, such vocal thirst for revenge, as there is in Baku.

With the agreement of the parties to the conflict, the OSCE, a pan-European organization, has taken on the mediation in this conflict, and it should duly confront all obstacles to its mission. Certainly the mediators are not judges, but neither should they compromise the very mission entrusted in them by the conflicting parties and the international community. Why should they remain silent while developments that undermine a peaceful settlement take place?

It is crystal clear that all this war rhetoric does not contribute to peaceful settlement, and on the contrary promotes hatred and mutual distrust. Why should mediators then remain silent?

They should either drop their careless attitude or drop their mission altogether.

And [confronting obstacles to settlement] should not be interpreted as pressure on the sides! This would be a form of counter-pressure and an effort to neutralize negative pressure that one of the conflicting parties is seeking to apply on another and, indirectly, on the mediators.

The mediators themselves are typically ambassadors and certainly, in terms of diplomatic hierarchy, there is a level of discomfort in criticizing a sitting president of another country, even if all three mediators would do it together. But there are higher institutions to do this.

There is the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. War rhetoric is a sufficient basis to raise concerns there in the form of a declaration. And while OSCE decisions require consensus by all members and such a declaration would not be formally adopted over Azerbaijan's objections, discussion itself would have a tempering effect.

There is the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, who is of course only a foreign affairs minister of a certain country, but who does have higher responsibilities entrusted in him or her by all 56 OSCE member-states and could afford to make statements. This could be done both publicly and by sending private communications to [Azerbaijan's President] Ilham Aliyev or [Defense Minister] Safar Abiyev.

But is this being done? No. [Perhaps] they are waiting for more serious crises.

There are four developments [that are already occurring and] that require not just discussion, but condemnation. First, the war rhetoric of officials in Baku, their hate-mongering against Armenians. Second, the increases in military budgets and the arms race. Third, the hypocritical approach toward cease-fire violations along the Line of Contact. And fourth, [Azerbaijan's] refusal to engage in confidence-building measures with Armenians.

Reporter: In your articles you frequently mention the February 1995 agreement on mechanisms for strengthening the cease-fire regime that all three sides signed under the OSCE aegis. You note that the sides are not fulfilling the responsibilities they took on under that agreement. What is the essence of that agreement and what can it do safeguard the cease-fire along the Line of Contact (LoC)?

Kazimirov: In principle, the situation has not changed since 1995. The LoC is still there, and incidents [violating the cease-fire] continue to occur as before this agreement. That document includes a mechanism for dealing with such incidents, to prevent a possible escalation.

It is because such incidents along the LoC were already taking place at that time, I proposed such an agreement to Swedish diplomats, who along with Russia were then co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. The Swedes agreed and we developed the text.

The mechanism is as follows: As soon as there is an incident, the aggrieved side immediately contacts their opposites across the LoC and also informs the Minsk Group co-chairs. And the other side, within six hours of receiving the protest is mandated to investigate the incident and offer explanations. Both sides would then offer assurances that measures are taken to prevent further escalation.

In other words the agreement would demand direct contacts between commanders in the field.

That document was signed by three defense ministers upon direct approval by then-Presidents Heydar Aliyev, Levon Ter-Petrossian, and Robert Kocharian.